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CASE COMMENTS
ALIENS-NATURALIZATION-PERSONS

oF JAPANESE

RACE.-

Appellant, a person of the Japanese race, applied to the U. S.
District Court of Hawaii to be admitted as a citizen of the
United States. It was conceded that he was well qualified by
character and education for citizenship, but the petition was
opposed by the United States on the ground that appellant being of the Japanese race and born in Japan was not eligible
for naturalization. And it was held by the court that being
of the Japanese race he was not eligible for naturalization as a
citizen of the United States under section 2169 of the Revised
Statutes, and his petition was denied.
Section 2169, which comes under the head "Naturalization,"
provides that "this title shall apply to aliens being free white
persons, and to aliens of African nativity and African descent."
By an -act of June 29, 1906, a uniform rule for naturalization
was provided for, and appellant claimed that section 2169 was
limited by this act. But such is not the case and the decision of
the circuit court, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, is
correct.
The act of 1906 on its face shows that it was passed to provide a uniform system of procedure and not to repeal any of
the existing statutes on the subject. The report of the House
Committee on the bill also shows the purpose of its enactment
is to establish a system of procedure. The court in construing
the act "had *a right to look to the reason of its enactment and
inquire into its antecedent history, and give it effect according
to its design and purpose and if necessary sacrifice its literal
meaning that the purpose may not fail." Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; Heydenfeldt v. Daney, 93
U. S. 634.
This is what the court did in its decision of this case, and
it properly held that the act of 1906 did not repeal the statutes
that have been in force since 1790 limiting naturalization to white
persons and to persons of African nativity.
The next question is: "Did the court err in holding that
appellant was not a free white person within the meaning of
section 2169, and therefore not eligible for naturalization?" In
the light of an almost unbroken line of decisions in the state
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and federal courts the court did not err in its decision. Beginning with the decision of the court in the case of In re Aib Yup,
5 Sawy. 155, most of the courts in construing this section have
held that the words "white persons" were meant to indicate
only a person of what is popularly called the Caucasian race.
Be Camille, 6 Sawy. 541; Be Kumagi, 163 Fed. 922; Be Ellis,
179 Fed. 1002; Be Charr, 273 Fed. 207. And in the case of
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U. S. 459, the court said:
"This conclusion has become so well established by judicial and
executive concurrence and legislative acquiescence that we should
not at this late hour feel at liberty to disturb it in the absence
of far more cogent reasons than any that have yet been suggested."
The appellant being a person of a race clearly not Caucasian
is not eligible for naturalization.
Ozawa v. United States, decided November 13, 1922, and
published in U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions, No. 2,
C.H.TL.
page 11.
BROKERS-REAL ESTATE BRoKER-CoMMSSIONS.-The defendant employed the plaintiffs, real estate agents, to sell at
public auction a farm and some town lots and agreed to pay
them a commission of five per cent if the sale was made, but
only $250.00 if no sale was made. The property was sold but
before the conveyance was made the defendant accepted of the
purchaser, who was insolvent, $300.00 in full settlement of
their claim for damages arising out of his refusal to execute the
contract of sale. Defendants refuse to pay the full commission
of five per cent and plaintiffs sue to recover that amount. Judgment in favor of plaintiffs for only $250.00 and interest. Plain-.
tiffs appeal. Held, judgment reversed.
While there are some decisions in England and a few in
America to the contrary, ,the great weight of authority is to the
effect that where the purchaser presented by the broker is accepted by the owner, and they enter into a binding contract of
sale, the broker is entitled to his commissions, although -the
purchaser proves to be financially irresponsible or fails to meet
the deferred payments, unless the broker has been guilty of
bad faith.
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In the case of Kalley, et at. v. Baker, 132 N. Y. 1, 1892, the
following rule is laid down: "When the broker brings to the
vendor a buyer who is willing to purchase on the vendor's -terms,
and the vendor is satisfied to accept him as purchaser, the broker
has earned his commission."
The case of Love, et al. v. Miller, et al., 53 Ind. 294, 1873,
holds that "When a broker brings about a contract which is
mutually obligatory on owner as vendor and a third person as
vendee, he is entitled to the agreed commission, -though the
vendee afterwards refused to execute his part of contract of
sale."
In the case of Oroxton's Extrx. v. Henry & Fleenor, 193
Ky. 318, 1921, it was held that "A broker with whom lands
are listed for sale is entitled to commissions as if he had sold
the farm when he finds and presents to the seller a buyer who
is ready, able and willing to take the lands at the price and on'
the terms and conditions named by the seller, even though the
sale, through no fault -of the broker, is not finally consummated."
Coleman's Exor. v. Meade, etc., 76 Ky. 358, holds that
"When a real estate broker undertakes to furnish a purchaser,
he is bound to act in good faith in presenting a person as such,
and when one is presented the employer is not bound to accept
him, or to pay the commission, unless he is ready and able to
perform the contract on his part according to the terms proposed. If 'the principal accepts the person presented, either
upon the terms previously proposed or upon modified terms
then agreed upon, and a valid contract is entered into between
the principal and the person presented by the broker, the commission is earned."
In the case mentioned above the question of insolvency of
the purchaser is offered as defense in the agent's action for
commissions, but it- was considered that the principal accepted
the purchaser within the meaning of the contract. "A written
contract for the purchase of the estate, binding both vendor
and purchaser, is a sale within the meaning of an agreement
to pay a commission to a broker upon a sale of the estate."
Bice v. Mayo, 107 Mlass. 550, 1871.
Where a contract has been made -by vendor and vendee, in
an action by a broker for commissions it is no defense to the
plaintiff's claim that the title to the property was defective.
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Knapp v. Wallace, 41 N. Y. 477, 1869; Roche v. Smith, 176
Mass. 595, 1900; Payne, et al. v. Pander, 77 S. W. 32, 1913.
The principle brought out in the case under discussion is
that if the agent finds a purchaser ready, willing and able "to
purchase on the terms fixed by the principal, he is entitled to
his commission although the principal refuse -to carry out the
sale on those terms, or the sale falls through from other causes.
Swinebroad, et al v. Foster, et al., 196 Ky. 459, 1922. S. B. N.
CRImInAL LAW-EVIDENCE or DECEASED WITNESS ON
FoRmEnR TR AL.-A witness was called for the prosecution in
a murder trial, and allowed to testify, over the objection of the
appellant, as -to what a witness, then dead, had testified on the
examining trial. The witness objected to was at the trial and
heard the testimony" given by the deceased witness. He did not
remember everything the deceased witness had said in her testimony or even the substance of all she had said at the examining trial. It was urged that the admission of this testimony was
erroneous and prejudicial.
The court sustained the contention saying in effect that
the testimony of a deceased witness is admissible if the witness
purporting to give it can state the whole substance of what was
sworn to, although he may not be able to give the exact words.
He must be able to state the substance of the whole and not
just a part of the testimony on the particular subject he is
called to prove. Kea/n v. Commonwealth, 10 Bush 190; Thompson v. Blackwell, 56 Ky. 608; O'Brien v. Commonwealth, 6
Bush 565.
It was formerly the rule that such testimony was not admissible unless the witness purporting to give it could state the
exact language used by the deceased witness. This has been
changed by the more recent decisions which are in accord with
the rule laid down in this case. This seems to be the better
doctrine because to say that a criminal, after having once been
convicted by the testimony of a certain witness, should go free,
simply because death has closed the mouth of that witn ess, would
be carrying his constitutional protection to an unwarrantable
extent. The law in its wisdom declares that the rights of the
public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental
benefit may be preserved to -the accused.
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The modern rule is that it is sufficient that the substance
or even the effect of the former testimony can be given by the
reporting witness. Ruck v. Rock Island, 97 U. S. 693; Gildersleeve v. Caraway, 10 Ala. 260; People v. Murphy, 45 Cal. 137;
Mitchell v. State, 71 Ga. 128; Luetgaert v. Volker, 153 Ill. 385;
Home v. Wiliams, 23 Ind. 37; Fell v. Burlington, etc., R. R.
Co., 43 Ia. 573; Gannon v. Stevens, 13 Kans. 447; Thompson v.
BlackweZl, 17 B. Mon. 609; Lime Rack Bank v. Hemett, 52 Me.
51; Black v. Woodrom., 39 Md. 194; Carey v. Jones, 15 Gray 543;
Carp v. Queen Ins. Co., 203 Mo. 295; Young v. Dearborn,22 N.
H. 372; Sloan v. Somers, 20 N. J. L. 66; Martin v. Cope, 28 N.
Y. 180; Wagers v. Dicey, 17 Ohio 439; Hepler v. Mt. Carmel
Savings Bank, 97 Pa. 420; Wade v. State, 7 Baxt. 80 (Tenn.);
Thurmond v. Trammell, 28 Tex. 371; Johnson v. 'Powers, 40 Ut.
611. For further citations see the note to Atchison, etc., B. R.
Co. v. Osborne, 91 Am. St. Rep. 189; Walker v. Commonwealth,
J. L.H.
196 Ky. 848, Dec. 15, 1922.
GAME-LICENSE TO TAKE USSELS-EFFECT oF ASSERTING
TITLE ix STATE.-The plaintiff was the owner of certain lands
through which ran a small stream. Defendant entered and
fished a quantity of mussels from the stream and carried away
the shells. Plaintiff seeks damages for the alleged trespass in
taking the mussels from his land. There were two counts: one
for the conversion of the shells and a second alleging that the
shells were a part of the realty and that the plaintiff was entitled to treble damages under the Missouri Revised Statutes of
1909, section 5448, and the Missouri Revised Statutes of 1919,
section 4242. Defendant also invoked the aid of the Missouri
Revised Statutes of 1909, sections 6508, 6551, which declare the
title to fish and game to be in the state.
The first count for conversion was dealt with in the lower
court by saying, "title to the property was in the state." At
common law animals ferae naturae were the property of no
man until reduced to actual possession. II. Kent's Comm., 347;
Young v. Hitchens, 6 Q. B. 606. This applied to game birds
and fish which could shift from one jurisdiction to another
without aid or consent of the landowner. In this case the court
placed mussels in another category, saying, "It seems not unreasonable to say that mussels having a practically fixed habitat
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and little ability to move, are as truly in the possession of the
owner of the land in which they are sunk as would be a prehistoric boat discovered underground, or unknown property at
the bottom of a canal." The authorities are ample in support
of this doctrine. Ewles v. Bridge Gas Co., L. R. 33 Ch. Div. 562;
Regina v. Rowe, C. C. 93; Barker v. Bates, 23 Am. Dec. 678.
The court further says, "This is even more obvious as to shells
when left piled upon the bank as they were to await transportation." Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 162 U. S. 366.
Another point directly bearing upon the first count was
the Missouri Revised Statutes of 1909, sections 6508, 6551, which
provided that title to game was in the state. If title to the
mussels was not in the plaintiff as owner of the land, then conversion would not lie. The court decided on this point saying
that title was in the state only for purposes of regulation and
control of such game. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416. Possession is enough to warrant recovery of substantial damages
for conversion by a trespass.
At common law the landowner could not keep the outsider
from coming upon his land and hunting game because of the
property in -the game, but for the trespass of coming onto his
land. Courts now recognize this to be an- inherent right of
property and not a mere right to prevent an invasion of the
owner. State v. Mallory, 73 Ark. 236; Hall v. Alford, 114 Mich.
165; Kellog v. King, 114 Cal. 378; Realty Company v. Johnson,
92 Minn. 363. But aside from that can the defendants be said to
have trespassed? The strict understanding of the English common law as to entry upon a close is mitigated in this country
due to the vast amount of open lands. Over these it is customary
to wander, shoot and fish at will. There was evidence in this
case of such a custom in Missouri. Regarding this point the
Supreme Court says: "Whether those who took mussels were
entitled to rely upon the custom of wandering and fishing over
open lands to the extent of continual and systematic work that
was done were questions for the jury and not for the court."
McKee v. Gratz, 43 Supreme Ct. 16, 67 L. Ed., decided during
E. S.
the October term of the Supreme Court, 1922.
HIGHWAYS-MOTOR

VMCLES-IMPUTING

CONTRIBUTORY

AUTOMOBIE.-The plaintiff alleged
in her petition that the appellant wrongfully and negligently
NEGLIGENCE TO INVITEE IN
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operated his car on the public highway by willfully and carelessly running it against a mule bitched to a buggy in which
plaintiff, her husband and two small children were riding,
whereby plaintiff sustained severe, painful and permanent injuries. The husband was driving the mule. The answer denied
the negligence charged, and pleaded contributory negligence on
the part of the plaintiff, which was denied in the reply. Held
that the appellant was liable for the injuries sustained by the
appellee, and there was no contributory negligence imputed from
the husband to the wife in this case.
The question arises, as to when the contributory negligence
of the driver of an automobile or other vehicle will be imputed
to a licensee or invitee riding in the vehicle.
In the cases of Winston's Admr. v. City of Henderson, 179
Ky. 220, and Barnes and Brother v. Easton's Admr., 190 Ky.
392, it was held that the negligence of the driver of an automobile or other vehicle would be imputed to an invitee or licensee
riding therein, if the latter had knowledge of the facts constituting the contributory negligence for a sufficient time prior
to the accident to enable him to take the requisite precautionary
steps to avert it. This rule seems to be supported by many jurisdictions. The Standard Oil Co. of Ky. v. Thompson, 189 Ky.
830; 226 S. W. 368; Bresee v. Los Angeles Traction Co., 149 Ca.
131, 85 Pac. 152, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1059; Vincennes v. Thuis,
28 id. App. 532, 63 N. E. 315; Cunningham v. Thief River Falls,
84 Minn. 21, 86 N. W. 763; Fechley v. Springfield Traction Co.,
119 Mo. App. 358, 96 S. W. 421; Meenagh v. Buckmaster, 50 N.
Y. Supp. 85; Hershey v. Mill Creek Tp., 6 Sadley (Pa.) 459.
The negligence of the driver of an automobile or other vehicle will not be imputed to the passenger when the contributory
negligence of the driver arises suddenly and without an opportunity of the invitee or licensee to exercise the proper care to
avoid its consequences or to provide for his safety. See Veach's
Admr. v. Louisville & I. Ry. Co., 228 S. W. 35; Pence v. Hines,
221 Ill. App. 584; Boyd v. Kansas City, 237 S. W. 1001; Parker
v. Seaboard Air Line By., 106 S. E. 755; Bevis v. Vanceburg
Telephone Co, 121 Ky. 177, 89 S. W. 126; Morris v. Metropolitan St. By. Co., 170 N. Y. 592, 63 N. E. 1119.
In the cases of Louisville R . Co. v. McCarthy, 129 Ky.
814, and City of Louisville v. Zoeller, 155 Ky. 192, it was held
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that the negligence of the husband as driver of the vehicle in
which his wife was riding could not be imputed to the latter,
unless the relation of naster and servant or principal and agent
existed at the time the accident occurred. This holding is consistent with the following cases: Cohill v. Cincinnati Ry. Co.,
92 Ky. 345; Robinson v. N. Y. R. R. Co., 66 N. Y. 11; St. Clare
B. R. Co. v. Edin, 43 Ohio 91; Shaw v. Croft, et al., 37 Fed. 317;
Sheffield v. Cen. Uiion,Tel. Co., 36 Fed 164; Honey v. Chicago
B. & 0. R. Co., 59 Fed. Rep- 423; Brubaker v. Iowa County,
183 N. W. 690; Corn v. Kansas City, etc., 228 S. W. 78; Ziegler
v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 220 S. W. 1016; Ward v. Clark,
179 N. Y. 466.
In the instant case, since the relation of master and servant
or principal and agent did not exist at the time of the accident,
and the plaintiff had no opportunity to prevent the injuries,
no contributory negligence could be imputed to the appellee, and
the decision is correct. Ray v. Ray, 196 Ky. 579, 1922. 0. W. C.
INSAWE PERSONS--CONTRACTS--MIENTAL CAPACITY-RESCISsION.-The plaintiff sold a certain tract of land to a person,
who gave him a check for $1,000.00 on the Bank of Lowes, as a
part of the purchase price. The Bank of Lowes refused to
honor or pay the check on the ground that the drawer was of
unsound mind, and incapable of transacting business. About
-two days later the officers of the bank carried the grantee before the Graves county court for an inquest, and she was adjudged non compos mentis, and a committee was appointed to
take care of her business affairs. This action was brought by
appellant against the bank to recover the amount of the cheek,
alleging the bank had wrongfully refused to pay the check.
Held, that the chancellor was right in granting judgment for the
defendants, since the grantee wis of unsound mind, when the
contract was made, and all the parties could be placed in statu
quo.
Insanity has been judicially defined to be such a derangement of the mental faculties that the individual has lost the
power of reasoning correctly. In re Brugh, 16 N. Y. Supp. 551;
Cundell v. Haswell, 23 R. I. 502, 51 Atl. 426; Johnson v. Maine
& N. B. Ins. Co., 83 Me. 182, 22 Atl. 107; Graha% v. Clapp,
184 N. W. 239, 22 Cyc. 1112.
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The following principles of law were discussed in the present case. A contract made in good faith by one in ignorance
of the imbecility of the other contracting party may be sustained, especially if the transaction is one to the advantage of
the imbecile, and the parties cannot be placed in statu quo.
This is a well established principle of law, and recognized by
many states. Rusk v. Fenton, 77 Ky. 490; Garlandv. Rice, 4 Ky.
Law Rep. 254; Jackson's Committee v. Mitchell, et al., 146 Ky.
382; Bayer v. Berryman, 125 Ind. 351; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Hunt, 79 N. Y. 541; Halsler v. Beard, 54 Ohio St. 398; Lancaster County Nat'l Bank v. Moore, 78 Pa. St. 407.
A contract made with a non compos mentis after inquest
and judgment finding him to be such, is absolutely void. This
rule is supported by numerous jurisdictions. See Pearl v. McDowefl and others, 26 Ky. 658; Lee v. Morris, 3 Bush 210; Willmerth v. Leonard, 156 Mass. 277; Imhoff v. Witmer, 31 Pa. St.
243; Criswold v. Butler, 3 Conn. 227; Fitzhugh v. Wilcox, 12
Bark (N. Y.) 235.
The rule refusing a rescission where the contract was made
in good faith before the inquest, does not necessarily prevail,
if the parties may be placed in statu quo. This has long been
the law of this state, as well as many other states. Breckinridge's
Heirs v. Ormby, 24 Ky. 236; Dowell v. Dowell's Admr., 137 Ky.
177; Alexander v. Hoskins, 68 Iowa 73; Chew v. The Bank of
Baltimore, 14 Md. 299; Holley v. Troster, 72 IMo. 73; Wagner
v. Harriott,10 N. Y. St. Rep. 709.
In the instant case, since the contract was made before the
inquest, and the parties can be placed in statu quo, it seems a
rescission was justifiable and the decision correct. Cask v. Bank
of Lowes, et al., 196 Ky. 570, 1922.
0. W. C.
INTOXICATING

LIQUORS--TRANSPORTATION-CIRCUmSTANTIAL

EVIDFNCE--INSTRUCTIONS-R- vRSAL.-On several occasions the

owner 6f a farm took small quantities of moonshine liquor from
a still operated on the farm and carried it in his pocket to his
^residence on -the same farm. He was convicted under chapter
81 of the acts of 1920, which made it unlawful to transport intoxicating liquor for other than sacramental, scientific, mechanical or medicinal purposes.
The case was appealed on the ground, among others, that
the Commonwealth failed to establish beyond a reasonable
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doubt that appellant transported any of the liquor to a point
off the farm, it being contended that transportation 5etween
points on the farm was not prohibited by the act of 1920.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that
the transportation from one part of a farm to another of small
quantities of liquor, illegally acquired, even though the farm
on which the transportation occurred be owned by the one
charged with committing the offense, was a violation of the
provisions of the act.
The court held that the lower court erred in charging the
jury that they might convict the accused upon circumstances
or circumstantial evidence alone if satisfied from such evidence,
beyond a reasonable doubt, of the defendant's guilt, as the court
may not instruct on abstract principles of law, or give any instruction that indicates an opinion as to the guilt or innocence
of the accused. Smith v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 599; Minniard
v. Commonwealth, 158 Ky. 210; Whitehead v. Commonweal.th,
192 Ky. 428. However, the court refused to reverse the judgment on account of this error as it was satisfied that the substantial rights of the accused were not prejudiced by the instruction. Scaggs v. Commonwealth, October 6, 1922, 196 Ky.
399.
P. T. P.
INTOXICATING

LIQUORS-GVING

LIQUOR

TO

ANOTHER-.

OF PRooF.-The appellant was indicted for a violation
of section 2554a-1, Kentucky Statutes. This is a section of the
1920 prohibition law, making it unlawful to give away spirituous liquors. A plea of not guilty was entered and a trial by
judy was waived. The facts upon which the indictment was
baled are that the appellant gave a drink of whiskey to a man
in'his (appellant's) "store." Upon these facts, the court found
the appellant guilty and rendered judgment against him.
The appellant seeks a reversal on the ground that the evidence contained in the agreed statement of facts did not prove
the offense denounced by the statute. The basis for this contention is that section 2554a-8, Kentucky Statutes, makes it lawful
for one to have spirituous liquors in his dwelling house, for his
personal use and that of his family and bona fide guests, and
that it was not proven that the liquor was given away at a
place other than in his dwelling house or to other than a bona

BURDEN
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fide guest. As to this, Chief Justice Hurt, speaking for the court,
says: "The right to have liquor in one's dwelling house, lawfully acquired, and to give it to a bona fide guest, is an exception
to the prohibition in the section of the statute which creates the
offense of giving away spirituous liquors, but, this exception is
contained in a section of the statute, which is subsequent to
and separate from the one creating the offense and it is not
necessary to negative it in the indictment, and the burden is
upon a defendant who asserts that his act, which would otherwise
be unlawful, fails within this exception, to sustain it by evidence." Commonwealth v. McClanahan, 2 Met. 8; Commonwealth v. Bierman, 13 Bush 345; Commonwealth v. Slaughter,
12 K. L. R. 893; Commonwealth v. Smitiers, 8 K. L. R. 612;
Commonwealth v. Benge, 13 K. L. R. 591. The judgment is
therefore affirmed. Simpson v. Commonwealth, October 27, 1922,
196 Ky. 403.
P. T. P.
MuNICnP&L

CORPOmiTIONS-LATENT

DEFECTS- NoTiCn-

1917, appellee's intestate, a young
man, while standing on the corner of Second and Broadway
streets in the city of Paducah, placed his hand on a metal post
which supported one of the electric lights of the city. This post,
due to defective wiring, was charged with electricity and the
moment he touched the post he was electrocuted. His administrator instituted this action against the city and the Electric
Light Company to recover damages for his death. The Light
Company, primarily liable, paid the administrator $7,500.00 in
settlement of its liability before the trial. The trial against the
city was then begun, which resulted in a judgment against the
city. The city then appealed on the ground that the court erred
in not directing a verdict in its favor.
The claim for a directed verdict was upon the ground that,
first, the defective wiring inside the post, which'it is conceded
charged the post with electricity and caused decedent's death,
was a latent defect of which the city had no notice; and that
the city was under no duty to inspect it and as a consequence
knowledge could not be imputed to it; second, that the evidence
was insufficient to prove constructive notice that the post was
dangerous and unsafe. The questions which are raised by the
appeal are: first, when is a city liable for latent defeots in its
NEGLIGENCE.-On August 8,
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property which cause damage; and, second, when can knowledge of a latent defect be held as imputed to a city?
The court in answer to the second question held, that while
a city was under no obligations to inspect the post, yet it was
under an obligation to inspect the sidewalks. Whether an inspection of the sidewalk would have disclosed the dangerous condition of the post was solely a question of fact for the jury
to decide. Whether or not notice can be held as imputed to
the city, depends not upon the nature of the defect, but upon
•all the facts and circumstances, which is a question for the jury
to determine. In affirming the judgment of the lower court this
court laid down this rule that a city is not liable for injuries
which result from a latent defect in the absence of actual notice,
unless the defect could have been discovered in time to have prevented the injury by the exercise of ordinary care and diligence,
on the part of the city authorities whose duty it is to inspect.
Thus the liability of the city rests upon the ground of negligence.
It was the duty of the city to inspect its sidewalks and had it
fulfilled this duty the defective condition of the post possibly
would have been discovered. This was a matter for the jury to
determine, its verdict alone could answer. Therefore, since the
whole case rested upon this matter of fact the court could not
have directed a verdict. The court was powerless to direct a
verdict with the main issues of fact undetermined. It was upon
this ground that this court held that the lower court could not
have directed a verdict and did not err when it refused to do so.
The question of notice was one of fact. The evidence
showed that the post had been for s6me time charged with electricity. Therefore, as there was such evidence as this -thecourt
held that it could not be said as a matter of law that if those
whose duty it was to inspect sidewalks had exercised reasonable
care and diligence, they could not have discovered the dangerous
condition of the post. Such would" necessarily have been the
case had the court directed a verdict. The rule of law established
by the court is a city is not liable for damages as a result of injuries caused by a latent defect, unless the defect would have
been discovered by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence
on the part of the city authorities whose duty it is to inspect.
In such cases the question is one for the jury and can not be
the subject of a directed verdict.
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The questions raised by this case have been before the courts
of this and other states on numerous occasions. The rule laid
down by the court in this case is the rule of a majority of the
states. In 28 Cyc. 1396, the principle which enters into the decision is laid down thus: the mere fact that the defect is hidden
and not observable to passersby and the city had no actual notice
of it, will not exempt it from liability, if the defect was of such
a nature that reasonable caution on the part of the municipal
authorities would have discovered it.
The courts of many of the states follow the principle, that
in order to hold *a city liable for latent defects, it must be
shown that the defect could have been discovered and remedied
by the exercise of reasonable care. Negligence must be proved.
Columb.us v. Anglin, 120 Pa. 785; Powell v. Bowen, 92 Ill. 785;
Kenyon v. IndianapolisWils., 129 (Ind.) ; Belkin v. Iowa Falls,
122 Iowa 430; Jones v. Greenboro, 124 N. C. 310. The matter in
a majority of these cases was that of defective sidewalks but the
principles involved were the same as in this case
The other states have also held that where a latent defect
could have been discovered by proper investigation the theory
of imputed knowledge can be proceeded upon. Mattoon v. Worlanzd, 97 111. App. 13; Abeline v. Cowperthart, 52 Kan. 324;
Drake v. Kansas City, 190 Mo. 370; Mathews v. Toledo, 21 Ohio
69; Beal v. Seattle, 28 Wash. 593. Some of the states have held
that in the case of latent defects resulting in injury, in order
to hold the city liable, either there must be expressed notice of
it, or, it must be so notorious as to be observable by all. This
seems to be the minority rule and one that the courts are
abandoning. The Pennsylvania courts in their earlier decisions
followd this rule but, in the case of Columbus v. Anglin, cited
above, abandoned it for the other rule.
The question of what constitutes notice has also been.before
.the courts of the other states. The general rule that is being
followed is knowledge or notice of a condition from defects
proximately follow as a probable cause is sufficient to charge
the city with notice of the defect. Corts v. D. C., 7 Mackey (D.
C.) 277; Bourget v. Cambridge, 159 Mass. 388; Sweeney v.
Butte, 15 Mont. 274; McClure v. Sparta, 84 Wis. 269. This
general rule was followed by the Kentucky court in rendering
this decision; for, as was shown by the evidence there had been.
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notice of the fact that for a number of weeks it had been noticed
that the post was charged with a small degree of electricity.
The general conclusion, as can be seen by a review of the
decisions of the courts of the various states, is that the holding
of the Kentucky court was consistent with the holding of the
courts of a majority of the states both as to the question of the
liability of a city for latent defects and as to that of notice or
imputed knowledge. City of Paducah v. Ivey's Administrator,
196 Ky. 484, Nov., 1922.
R. 0. S.
NUISANCE--UNLAWFUL

INTERFERENCE

WITH

ENJOYMENT OF

REsmENE.-The plaintiff brought a suit to restrain the defendant from operating a lying-in hospital on adjoining property,
the buildings being at some points ten feet apart, evidence disclosing shrieks and groans of patients and offensive odors emanating from narcotics, disinfectants, and other drugs necessary to
be used in such an institution.
The injunction restraining the defendant from operating
the lying-in hospital was granted. Such an interruption by
noises and odors as will interfere with the plaintiff's comfortable enjoyment of his residence will give him sufficient justification to demand an injunction, even though the business complained of is lawful and necessary in its nature. Such a nuisance is not a nuisance per se but because of extraneous circumstances, "such as locality, proximity to the complaining
party, manner and methods of operation or for similar reasons
it has become a nuisance."
The present injunction does not prevent the defendant from
operating a 'general hospital, since the injunction is only asked
to be applied to lying-in patients. The plaintiff asks in a cross
appeal that the injunction be applied to patients in general
but the court refused to grant it on the ground that the allegation that "its consequential effects might be -sufficient to reduce the value of the plaintiff's property is not sufficient in and
of itself to create an abatable nuisance."
The case, taking into consideration the facts, the adjoining
residence ten feet away and the peculiar noises and odors coming from a lying-in hospital at that distance falls within the
general line of authorities.
"The question in such cases is whether the annoyance produced is such as to materially interfere with the ordinary corn-
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fort of human existence. Duncan v. Hayes and Greenwood, 22
N. J. Eq. 25; Ross v. Butler, 19 N. J. Eq. 294; Baltimore B.
R. Co. v. Fifth Baptist Church, 108 U. S. 317. It is not of
course. necessary that the annoyance and discomfort should be
so great as to actually drive the person complaining thereof from
his dwelling. Perrin v. Cresent City Stock Yard, 43 So. 938;
Bohan v. Port Jervis Light Co., 122 N.' Y. 18. But if the alleged
injury be a plain interference with ordinary comforts and enjoyment, there is a nuisance, no matter how slight the damage,
provided the inconvenience be actual and not fanciful." 29
Cyc. 1191; Cooper v. Randall, 53 Ill. 24.
"The erection and maintenance of a hospital may be a
work of the highest philanthropy, but if it operates to destroy
the peace, quiet and comfort of those in adjoining residences,
the court will not hesitate to adjudge it a private nuisance to
those who are in no way responsible for its location and operation." Burdick's The Law of Torts (2nd Edition) 399.
In cases relating to hospitals, the nuisance is not per se.
"A hospital of gracious design, with modern equipment and a
high personnel, erected for the care of crippled children, is not
a nuisance per se." Hall v. House of St. Giles, The Cripple,158
N. Y. S. 1117. Nor is a hospital a nuisance prima facie, 29 Cyc.
1175; Bessonier v. The City of Indianapolis,71 Ind. 189.
The location and construction of a tuberculosis hospital
building does not constitute a nuisance per se. State v. Brenner,
6 Ohio App. 209; City of Northfield v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 95 Atl. 745; Le Bourgeois v. City of New Orleans, 82
Southern 268. Contra: Everett v. Paschall,111 Pac. 879. And
under statute declaring it to be a communicable disease. Brink
v. Shepard, 184 N. W. 404.
If patients cared for have infectious diseases, and the hospital is located in the residential part of the city an injunction
may lie. "Hospitals for the treatment of patients suffering from
infectious or contagious diseases are nuisances when located in
the residential parts of cities and towns, and the danger differs
in kind and not in degree. Shepard v. City of Seattle, 109 Pac.
1067; Emrich v. Marcucilli, 196 Ky. 495, Nov., 1922
R. M M.
PROMIMOITN-COURT

EXCEEDING

JURISDICTION-LABEAS

CoRus--REia".-The plaintiff, who had committed no offense,
was arrested without a warrant, and without any charge being
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preferred against him, was committed to jail by the defendant
because the plaintiff did not execute a peace bond to the amount
of $2,000.00. The order committing the plaintiff to jail was
issued in the absence of the plaintiff and he had no knowledge
of it until it was too late to be heard, the circuit court having
adjourned. The county judge had refused to issue a writ of
habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals in granting a writ of
prohibition restraining further enforcement of the order held:
1. That the defendant acted without, or in excess of his jurisdiction by requiring the plaintiff to give bond and committing him
to jail in default thereof, in absence of, and without knowledge
of plaintiff, or an opportunity to be heard, when there was no
charge against him. 2. As there was no appeal from the defendant's order, and the plaintiff was then in jail, he was without
adequate remedy elsewhere. 3. That the writ would furnish
complete relief by ordering the plaintiff released.
"A writ of prohibition is granted by a superior court to
restrain an inferior tribunal from wrongfully assuming jurisdiction and for the purpose of preventing a clear excess of
jurisdiction." Such a writ will be granted only when there is
no other adequate remedy elsewhere. Speckert v. Ray, 166 Ky.
622, lays down the principle: "A writ of prohibition may be
issued by a circuit court against an inferior court, or by an appellant court against a circuit court, where the writ is the only
adequate remedy to which the party applying therefor may resort." This view is supported by the following cases in other
jurisdiction: People v. Hoglund, 93 Ill. 292; Nichols v. Judge.,
Grand Rapids Sup. Court, 130 Mich. 187; McDonald v. Agnew,
122 Cal. 448; Sherlock v. Jacksonwille, 17 Fla. 83; and State v.
Shannon, 19 S. E. 376. On the other hand, the case of McGee v.
Weissinger, 147 Ky. 321, presents the same view in a negative
manner. In that case it is held that a writ of prohibition will
not lie for the reason that there is an adequate remedy elsewhere.
Carey v. Sampson, 150 Ky. 160, is in accofcd with McGee v.
Weissinger.
Under. section 110 of the Constitution a superior court is
given power to prohibit an inferior court from proceeding beyond its jurisdiction. Equitale Life Assurance Society v.
Hardin, 166 Ky. 51, is the leading Kentucky case for this authority granted under the Constitution. Spekert v. Ray, 166 Ky.

KENTUQKY LAW JouRNAL

622, also supports this principle. The following cases in other
jurisdictions hold that a writ of prohibition will be granted to
prevent an inferior court from exceeding its jurisdiction: State
v. Craig, 100 Minn. 352; Tehan v. Justices, Boston Municipal
Court, 191 Mass. 92; People v. McAdams, 84 N. Y. 287; State
v. Hazelwood, 196 P. 937; Harrisv. Sup. Court, Sacramento Co.,
196 P. 895; State ex rel. L. J. Mueller Furnace Co. v. Buckner,
229 S. W. 392. A writ will not be issued against a tribunal
having jurisdiction of a matter or cause which is before it.
Donlan v. City Councit of the City of Boston, 131 N. E. 329,
nor can jurisdiction be taken from a court on the ground that
it may decide-erroneously. Chiles v. Sheffer's Executors, 146
Ky. 42. But when an inferior court is actually proceeding
erroneously within its jurisdiction and remedy by appeal is inadequate, a writ of prohibition will be granted. Equitable Life
Assurance Society v. Hardin, 166 Ky. .51.
The case of Bowles v. Manning is in accord with the weight
of authority in Kentucky and elsewhere in .holding that a writ
of prohibition will be granted to prevent an inferior court from
exceeding its jurisdiction where there is no adequate remedy
elsewhere. Bowles v. Manning, Judge, 196 Ky. 633:
RAI0ADS-CO NT=BUTORY

NEGLiIGFE-CRosSINGS-SIG-

NALs.-The deceased attempted to cross a double track railroad
immediately behind a train traveling on the near track without
waiting to see if there was a train approaching on the other
track from the opposite direction.. The-signal crossing bell had
ceased ringing after the first train had cleared the crossing.
The car deceased was riding in was struck by a train coming
from the opposite direction from which the first train came and
the deceased was killed. There was a verdict by the lower court
for $20,000.00. The upper court reversed this decision on the
ground that there was prejudicial error in the instruction to
the jury and directed a new trial.
The lower court rightfully left the question of contributory
negligence on the part of the deceased to the jury. The jury
found that there was no negligence on the part of the deceased
and the upper court raised no question as to this part of the
case. *Wthere the assurance of safety is conveyed by a signal
from a guard or by open gates or by the causing of a bell .to
sound its danger alarm, either in the city or the country, a travel-
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er is not required to exercise the same vigilance in looking and
listening for a train as he would if there was no such signal.
In the note to Union P. R. R. Co. v. Rosewater, 15 L. R. A. (NS.) 803, we find the following statement, "The general rule undoubtedly does not require a traveler about to use a grade crossing to eiercise the same vigilance in looking and listening when
he is signaled by a flagman to cross as when the approaches are
not guarded, and the decisions as to the circumstances under
which, and to what extent, he may relax his vigilance, are widely
divergent, and each depends to a large extent on its own surrounding circumstances. However, this question is one almost
universally for the determination of the jury, as it is only in
exceptional eases that the question of contributory negligence
can be decided as a matter of law." In the present case there
was no signal from a guard to cross, but the silence of the crossing bell puts the cases on the same fboting. Also, in this case
the question of contributory negligence was rightfully left to
the jury. Though it seems to be the law in some states that a
traveler must stop, look and listen before crossing a railroad, in
Kentucky a traveler is required to exercise only ordinary vigilance in looking and listening before crossing. In L. & N. B. R.
Co. v. Ueltschi's Exors., 29 ky. Law Rep. 1136, the deceased was
killed while attempting to cross a railroad and the court refused
to instruct the jury that the deceased should have stopped,
looked and listened before attempting to cross the railroad. L.
& N. R. R. Co. v. Onan's Admr., 110 S. W. 380, 33 Ky. Tiaw
Rep. 460, and Southern R. Co. in Kentzwky v. Winwhester's
Bxtx., 32 Ky. Law Rep. 19, follow this rule.
The lower court also erred in instructing the jury that, "if
the crossing was especially dangerous and by reason thereof the
signal by bell or whistle (from the train) was not reasonably
sufficient under the circumstances to warn travelers on the
highway of the approach of the train, then it was the duty of
the defendant's servants in charge of the train to use such other
means to give warning of the approach of the train as an ordinarily prudent person operating a railroad would have adopted
under like circumstances." The fact that the railroad company
went to an additional expense and trouble over and above that
required by the statutes in erecting additional appliances for
the protection of the public is not to be taken as an admission.
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that this was an extremely dangerous crossing (though they
may be held liable for injuries resulting from its neglect to
see that they arc in good working order) and to impose upon the
tranmn ai obligation as in the Treanor ease, "to use such
other means to give warning of the approach of the train as an
ordinarily prudent man operating a railroad would have adopted under like circumstances." L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Treanor's
Ad.h;r., 179 Ky. 337. There was no evidence here that this was
an extremely danigerous crossing and Treanor's case was not
in point. Payve, Agent, et al. v. Barnette's Administrator,196
J. W. C.
Ky. 4S9. Nov. 17, 1922.
TonTs-ATTrkCTivE NUISANcE-NEGLIGEN-CE.-The

defend-

ant railway company had its tracks under a street which was
carried over the tracks by a steel bridge. The bridge is formed
of posts, beams, girders, etc., connected and strengthened by
trellis and lattice work. The top girders were 23 feet above
the street. Fastened to the top girders at each end of the
bridge are two upright steel posts. About six feet above the
bases of these posts cross arms are attached, bearing bare wires
carrying electric current. Small boys could climb up to the wire
and often did so. Signs were placed at each end of the bridge,
warning of the danger. The plaintiff, eight years old, climbed
up the post in search of a bird's nest. He saw a bird on the
wire and in an effort to catch the bird his hand fell across the
wire and a severe injury resulted. Held, there can be no general duty on the part of a landowner to keep his land safe for
children, or even free from hidden dangers, if he has not directly
or by implication invited or licensed them to come there. The
defendant was not held liable because there was no evidence
that he either directly or impliedly invited the plaintiff to
climb the post and touch the wire.
The argument in this case is centered around the doctrine
of "attractive nuisance." It is not a new doctrine in this
country, having been in effect in some states for about thirtyfive years, and in many others for a shorter period. Sioux City
& P. B. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745; SiddalZ v.
Jansen, 168 Ill. 43, 39 L. R. A. 112, 48 N. E. 191; Edington v.
Burlingtou, C. R. & N. B. Co., 116 Ia. 410, 57 L. R. A. 561;
Swartwood v. LouisviVle & N. B. Co., 33 Ky. L. Rep. 785, 19
L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094. The rule seems to be that if the object
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is such that it attracts irresponsible persons upon the premises,
thereby causing the person so attracted to be injured, or if
children are in the habit of playing upon the premises with the
owner's knowledge and become injured, the owner will be liable
even though he has exercised due care. Schmidt v. Kansas City
Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 284. Although the child injured may
have been a trespasser, if it is of such an age that it has no
discretion, the owner is bound to exercise due care to anticipate
or prevent the injury. Kentucky CentralR. R. Co. v. Gastineau's
Admr., 83 Ky. 119. In the latter case, the doctrine of the turntable cases is upheld In the case of Bronson's Admr. v. Labrot,
81 Ky. 638, a person who had carelessly piled lumber on his
own unfenced lot so that a child was injured while playing on
the lot by a falling piece from the lumber pile was held liable.
By these cases it can be seen that the doctrine of attractive nuisance is favored in Kentucky. The case of Brown v. Chesapeake
& 0. 1. Co., 123 S. W. 298, 19 L. R. A. (N, S.) 717, (a Ky.
case), upholds the turntable doctrine. In a note in the case of
Cahill v. Stone, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1094, the doctrine of attractive nuisance, or as it is sometimes termed, the turntable
cases, is treated very satisfactorily. An intermediate position
has accordingly been taken in most jurisdictions requiring of
infants the exercise of such care in avoiding injury as children
of the same age of ordinary prudence are accustomed to exercise under the same or similar circumstances. 17 Harv. L. Rev.
564. This doctrine is further evidenced in the case of Fisk v.
Missouri Furnace Co., 10 Mo. App. 61, where it was held that
a party excavating for sand in a neighborhood where there are
sev'eral children owes a duty to keep the children away from
the pit. The present case is practically in keeping with these
authorities. If it had been proven that the boy was invited to
touch the wire or attracted to it the defendant would have been
held liable. New York N. H. & Hf. R. Co. v. Fruchter,43 S.
Ct. 38, 67 L. Ed.
J.B.N.
TRESPASS-ACTION FOR REmOVAL o

SAND AND GRAVEL FROM

Rnvm FRONT.-Appellee owned a tract of land fronting on the
Ohio river, and appellant entered upon the river in front of
her premises with boats and machinery and carried away large
quantities of sand and gravel, which it marketed. This action
was brought to recover damages for the wrongful taking and
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carrying. away of said sand and g'ravel. Held, that Kentucky
landowners having land fronting on the Ohio river, own to the
thread of the stream, and being in such possession, are entitled
to and have control of sandbars built up between the south.
shore of the river and the thread of the stream, and no one has
a right to trespass upon same.
The court in its decision of this -case followed the old English common law rule, which has often been held to be the law
of this state, although it is in direct conflict with the decisions
of many of the American states and especially the more modern
decisions. The English courts said a stream was navigable if
the tide ebbed and flowed; a grant of land bordering on such
a stream extended only to the high water mark, and the shore
belonged to the crown. On the other hand, if the tide did not
ebb and flow, a grant carried an absolute right to the thread
of the-stream.
In a number of early cases Kentucky adopted this rule,
and as the tide does not ebb and flow in the Ohio river, it
was held that the Kentucky landowners along said river own to
the thread of the stream, and in a conveyance of such land the
fee passes to that extent. Berrj v. Snyder; 3 Bush 266, and
cases there cited. Contra: 3 B. Mon. 143, and cases there cited.
But the rule as laid down in Kentucky has been severely
criticized in a majority of the other states, and the trend of
the decisions in the latter line of cases has been to do away with
the English rule and to hold that the rule applicable to tide
water streams is applicable to streams that are navigable in
fact. Although this is still the minority rule it has several. times
been held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be the
rule appliable to all the large American rivers that are navigable in fact. 12 How. 454, Genessee v. Fitzigh. The BedfordC. H. L.
Nugent Co. v. Herndon,196 Ky. 477. Nov 14, 1922.
TRUSTS-RESULTING

TRUSTS-PAYMENT

OP

CONSmERATION

ANOTHErw-Where the consideration for the purchase of land was furnished by one person and
the conveyance made to another with consent of the payor and
without breach of trust, held no resulting trust accrues to the
one paying the consideration.
The general doctrine is that a resulting trust always arises
by implication of law and the question of a resulting trust arisBY ONE AND

CONVEYANCE TO
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ing depends on the laws of the particular state. Potter v. Claq3p,
203 Ill. 592; Feely v. Hoover, 130 Pa. St. 107. But in Jenkins
v. Eldredge, Fed Cas. 7,266, the court said that a resulting
trust can only arise by consent of the parties.
The majority of authorities as to a resulting trust hold
that, in the absence of statutory provisions holding otherwise,
when the property is taken in the name of one party and title
is taken in the name of another, a resulting trust arises in favor
of the person whose money or assets were used, or persons taking under him. This is true regardless of an actual intention
on the part of the party purchasing and taking the conveyance
to hold the equitable title for the party whose funds were used
in the purchase. Howe v. Howe, 199 Mass. 598.
This rule is not altered by the death of the person to whom
the conveyance was made, nor by the fact that notice to the
grantee of the conveyance was made, or that he had made no
agreement to hold the estate. Williams v. Wager, 64 Vt. 326.
Under statutes in some jurisdictions where conveyance is to
one and consideration paid by another, the title vested in the
grantee a'nd no trust results.to the one paying the consideration,
and Kentucky is included among these. Section 2353, Kentucky
Statutes. But before this statute a trust resulted in favor of
the payor, 1 Bibb. 609; Caldwell v. Caldwell, 70 Ky. 515.
In the case of Marchilliant v. March-illiant, 125 Ind. 472,
no trust resulted where consideration is paid by one and title
is taken by another unless without consent or by agreement.
conveyance was made to hold land in trust. Ace. Acker v. Priest
99 Ia. 610.
The case of Waldron v. Merrll, 154 Mich. 203, holds that
where a grant for a valuable consideration is made by one person and consideration paid by another there is no resulting
trust. Leary v. Corvin, 181 N. Y. 222, is in accord with this
doctrine. That case holds that, where a daughter furnished
money to her father to build a house, to go .to her at his death,
no trust resulted to her favor.
-In Tabim v. Tabin, 139 Wis. 494, when consideration for
real property is paid by one and title to another no resulting
trust can be held by the party paying the consideration.
Kentucky cases are in accord with the cases cited above,
according to section 2353 of "thestatutes. The statutes provide

KENTucKY LAw JOURNAL

that no trust results except when (a) the grantee takes in his
own name without consent of the person paying the consideration, or (b) by violation of a trust as in the case of Roche v.
Roche, 188 Ky. 327, where the husband had a deed to a farm
made to him without the knowledge of his wife who paid the
consideration; held, this was a resulting trust under the statute, but here the husband admitted the wife's title, and before
his death desired her to have the farm. This is in accord with
section 2353 exception (a) of the Kentucky Statutes.
Again in the recent case of Acker v. Henry Clay Oil Co.,
196 Ky. 508, where the wife paid for the land and her husband
took the assignment without 4er consent, held a trust will result but the evidence must be clear and convincing.
At any rate, according to the holding of Smith v. Smith,
121 S. W. 1002, the status is that of trustee and cestui qui
trust and the grantee is liable to the person contributing the
money, as for money had and received.
The prevailing doctrine that where the purchase price is
furnished by a child to the parent or one in loco parentis, a
resulting trust is formed, is upheld in Harlan v. Eilde, 100 Ky.
641, but here the trust was enforced because the son had no
knowledge of the deed given to the father. Ace. Bojd v. Jones,
8 Ky. L. Rep. 602.
Since the case under discussion does not fall under any of
the exceptions as held in the Kentucky cases, that it was not
without the consent of the person paying the consideration or in
violation of some trust, then there was no resulting trust. Bybee
v.Wilson, 196 Ky. 644. Dee. 1, 1922.
J. S. C.
WILLS-TRUSTS-LIFE ESTATES ENLARGED
TESTAMENTARY

TO

FEE

SInMPLE-

TRuST.-Where the will gave the wife power

to handle the corporation business and a farm to go to her to
manage but not to sell, held all assets of the firm may be used
in the prudent management of the business but with n6 right to
employ in that business any assets individually nor to mortgage
the farm.
In a will giving a life estate, no mention being made of
remainders, this estate cannot be enlarged to a fee simple. Giles
v. Little, 104 U. S. 291. A power of a life tenant is ordinarily
limited to the duration of the tenancy, although the words used
may give the life -tenant power to convey a fee simple. Wood-
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ridge v. Jones, 183 Mass. 549. A limited power must be exeercised strictly within its limits, and in good faith, and an absolute power to convey attached to an expressed life estate will
not enlarge it to a fee simple. McCann v. McCann, 93 S. W.
1045; Payne v. Johnson, 95 Ky. 175; Kirkpatrick v. Kirkpatrick,
197 Ill. 144.
The absence of a limitation over may indicate that the first
taker is to have an absolute estate, although expressly limited
for life, but not where a life' estate is clearly indicated. In
Matter of Hoyt, 24 N. Y. Supp. 577, where rents from real
estate went to the daughter for life with no limitation over
after the daughter's death, held only a life estate.
The case of Boston Safety Deposit & Trust Co. v. Buffurn,
186 Mass. 242, holds that where a father bequeathed realty to
his daughter for life for her sole use without disposing of the
remainder, the court held this was only a life estate.
Shaner v. Wilson, 207 Pa. St. 550, is in accord, holding
that, where the testator devised realty to his son during his
natural life without any disposition of the remainder in fee,
the son acquired a life estate only, with the remainder to the
heir of the testator. Ace. Ind., Ga., S. C., W. Va.
Under the construction of the will in the case under discussion, a testamentary trust was given the widow A testamentary trust is created when it clearly appears that the testator's intention was, that the donee should take beneficially without any particular words being used to so indicate. Patrick v.
Patrick, 122 S. W. 159. The trust exists when the will recites
"To the wife for her benefit and the benefit of her children."
90 Ky. 116.
If the word "wish" or "will" is imperative, it created a
trust. Prichard on Wills, sees. 12-253-456; Hill v. Page, 36 S.
W. 735.; Curd v Field, 103 Ky. 293. The words used in the
will in the case under discussion, being similar, the trust is
created for the benefit of the children and for the wife to manage the business of the testator.
A right to mortgage may be implied by the right to sell
but usually is not. Paine v. Barnes, 100 Mass. 470. Kentucky
following this rule, the farm cannot be mortgaged. This state,
as shown by cited cases, follows the general rule regarding the
interpretation of wills.
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Since the will expressly forbade any sale of the land, it follows that this land could not be mortgaged for any purpose, by
the life tenant. And in accordance with the weight of authority, a will granting a trustee power to carry on business,
implies a power to incur debts and transact all necessary business. Woddrop v. Weed, 154 Pa. 307; Ac. Mass., N. Y.
The authority does not extend to realty unless so specified
in the will, but only to the assets of the business over which
the party is trustee. Covington v. Covington, 196 Ky. 667. Dec.
J. S.C.
1, 1922.
VENDOR AND PUROHASEaR-DEICENCY IN QUANTITY OF LAND

N Goss.-The plaintiff traded a farm of 155 acres to
-SALF
the defendant for a farm supposed to contain 390 acres. Seven
years after the trade the plaintiff, planning to sell, had a survey
of the property made and learned that there was a shortage of
45 acres. Two years previous to the discovery of the deficiency
the plaintiff made final payment of money due under the contract. Plaintiff instituted a suit in equity to recover over-payment on tract due to shortage of 45 acres. Judgment in lower
dourt for $3,375.00, with interest, the amount claimed. Appeal
by defendants to reverse the judgment. Held, judgment affirmed.
In case of a material deficiency the vendee of land is entitled to the refunding of the amount due to the shortage. In
the case of Gallup v. Bernd, 30 N. E. 743, 1892, a New York
case, it was held that "where a vendor, in selling land by the
acre, by mistaku overstates the amount thereof, the right of the
vendee, after the contract is executed, to demand an abatement
of the purchase price, is equitable, and the ten years statute of
limitations applies."
The case of Hoover, et al. v. Sensman, 4Atl. 730, 1886 (Pa.),
held that "Where, by a mutual mistake, six acres more than was
contained in a piece of land was sold, bought, and paid for at
$135.00 per acre, in view of the price paid, this was too large a
deficiency not to be relieved against in equity."
It is a well established rule in Kentucky that "In the sale
of a tract of land where there is a deficit of as much as ten per
cent or more in the quantity, the purchaser will be entitled to
relief to the. extent of the value of the deficit; that is what the
value of the quantity contained in the deficiency would, if in-
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eluded in the deed, have borne to that of the entire tract as described in the deed; and this is so whether the sale be made in
gross or by the acre. The words 'more or less' in a deed relieve
only from the necessity for exactness and not from gross deficiency." Harrison v. Talbott, 2 Dana 266, 1834; Smith v.
Smith, 4 Bibb. 81; Morris v. McDonald, 196 Ky. 721, 1922.
S. B. N.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SPECIFIC PERFORMANE.-The appellant sold appellee a certain house and lot to which he had
no title. He subsequently procured title, but refused to convey, and this action was brought for specific performance of the
contract. Held, the decree for specific performance of the lower
court was affirmed.
It seems to be a well sfttled principle of law in this jurisdiction that when one contracts to convey realty to another
by certain date and if he has procured title to the property by
that date, he must specifically perform his contract. And it
is no defense that he did not have title at the time of making
the contract. A similar decision was handed down in Fleming
v. Harrison,2 Bibb. 171. And again the principle was recognized
in Jenkins v. Hamilton, 153 Ky. 163, in which the vendor was
unable to procure the title which he had contracted to convey,
nevertheless, the court said he was liable in damages for a
breach of 'contract. However, some courts will not compel the
vendee to specifically perform his contract but rather leave the
vendor to his right of action at law. In this jurisdiction he like
the vendor must specifically perform as was laid down in Handley
v. Tibibits, 16 S. W. 131, a Kentucky case, "Where the vendor
acquires the legal title before the time for him t convey, the
vendee cannot resist the payment of the purchase money because the vendor had & tite bond only when the contract was
made." This decision is,
also in keeping with the decisions of
a majority of other jurisdictions as in Rutland v. Brister; 53
Miss. 683, where the court said: "A person may bargain to convey land to which he has no title, legal or equitable.
There is no force in the objection that the party had no title
at the date of his contract."
Also in Hale v. Cravers, 128 Ill. 408, and in Trask v. Vinson, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.) 105, where somewhat different facts

KENTUCKY LAW JouRJAL
were involved but the same principle was followed. No~an v.
Highbaugh, 196 Ky. 563, 1922.
C. Ar. C. P.
WATErS AND WATER COURSES-RAILROAD

EMBNMMENTS-

CONSTRucTIN.-Where a permanent structure by a
railroad is negligently constructed by the failure to leave sufficient openings in an embankment to permit the ordinary
volumes of water to pass through, but the same cannot be repaired or remedied at a reasonable expense so as to avoid recurring injuries by the water, or where the expense of repairing or remedying would be so great as to authorize the company in the exercise of its right of eminent domain to condemn the adjacent property go injured by the negligent construction, there must be a recovery once for all; and this is not
dependent upon whether the permanent structure is or is not
negligently constructed, but is based upon the sound public
policy that the interest of the public requires'that a carrier of
passengers and freight, authorized by law to exercise the right
of eminent' domain, shall not be required to make such repair
where the cost thereof is out of proportion to or greater than
the injury to the adjacent property.
In regard to whether the structure could be repaired at a
reasonable expense the court said in effect that the value of the
adjacent property should be taken into consideration and that
the jury should be so instructed.
The reasonable expense contemplated is such expense as
will not exceed in value the injury to the property involved and
if the expense of the repair work is equal or in excess of the
injury to the property because of the negligent construction,
then there should be a recovery as for permanent injury and
once for all.
There is some confusion in the decisions of the courts as to
the application of the rules of law so as to determine when
there shall be a recovery "once for all" and when there may be
"recurring" recoveries.
The Kentucky court has laid down very practical and
sound rules in such cases, and has said that in actions for overflow of land, a single recovery must be had for all damages resulting from a permanent structure properly built; for a structure unlawfully or negligently built, though intended to be
permanent, recurring recoveries may be had as the injuries ocNEGLIGENT

CASE COMMENTS

cur; for a temporary structure recurring recoveries may be had
as the injuries occur; that whether the construction" is negligent
is a question for the jury. M. H. & E. B. R. Co. v. Graham, 147
Ky. 604; M. H. & E. R. R. Co. v. McDowell, 147 Ky. 608. See
also St. Louis A. & T. H. B. Co. v. Brown, 34 Ill. App. 552.
In L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Orr, 91 Ky. 109; Hay v. City of
Lexington, 114 Ky. 669; Richmond v. Gentry, 136 Ky. 319, and
many similar cases, it was held that the structure being permanent and properly constructed, a recovery once for all must be
had.
There are also cases where the trouble cannot be remedied
at a reasonable expense or would be so great as to justify the
railroad in taking the property under the power of eminent domain. In such cases the recovery should be once for all. L. &
N. R. B. Co. v. Whitsel4 125 Ky. 433; 1. C. B. Co. v. Haynes,
122 S. W. 211; L. H. & St. L. By. Co. v, Roberts, 144 Ky. 820,
The holding in this case is undoubtedly in accord with the
weight of authority It is in accord with Stodghill v. C. B. & Q.
R. R. Co., 53 Iowa 341; Town of Troy v. Cheslire B. Co., 3
Foster (N. H.) 83; Van Zandt v. N. Y., 21 N. Y. Super. Ct. 375.
Contra: Cum.berland & Oxford Canal Corp. v. Hitchlugs, 65 Me.
140; Van Hoozier v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co., 70 Mo. 145; Rare
v. Hoffman, 79 Pa. St. 71; L. & N. B. B. Co., et al, v, Bennett,
J. L. H.
196 Ky. 679, 1922.
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